On 3 October 2025, the Court of Appeal (“CoA”) of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) rendered its decision in the case between Koninklijke Philips N.V. (”Philips”) and several Belkin entities (”Belkin”) and three of its managing directors. In the following article, the decision will be briefly summarized and commented, providing the UPC practitioner with the key take-aways and some food for thought.
Philips’s patent at issue, EP 2 867 997 (“EP 997”) relates to inductive power transfer, in particular the contested embodiments are power transmitters for inductive power transfer to a power receiver that meet the requirement of the “Extend Power Profile” of the Qi standard. These embodiments are reflected in chargers for wireless charging of electronic devices.
Preceding to the decision of the CoA, Phillips filed an infringement action against two of the Belkin entities at the Regional Court of Düsseldorf for infringement of the German part of the patent at issue. In first instance, the action was dismissed and, in appeal, the case was dismissed as inadmissible. This infringement action was followed by a nullity action, filed by Belkin, which was also dismissed in first instance.
Philips is of the opinion that the contested embodiments implement the features of the patent claims and, for this reason, it lodged an infringement action against Belkin before the Local Division Munich (“LD Munich”). In answer, Belkin filed a counterclaim for revocation.
In short, the LD Munich found that Belkin infringed the patent and could therefore be held liable, along with the managing directors in their capacity as intermediaries. Nevertheless, the LD Munich denied Philips’ recall, remove from distribution channels and destruction request. Consequently, both Philips and Belkin appealed the decision.
In its decision of 3 October 2025, the CoA confirmed that EP ‘997 is infringed, however slightly reformed the first instance decision on the aspect of liability. Although the technical aspects are also a relevant read, in the present article, the focus will be on the legal and non-technical aspects of this decision.
The first relevant thing to note is that Belkin argues that the final judgement and reasoning of the Regional Court of Düsseldorf (“German national decision”) in which Philips’ infringement action was dismissed would be binding to the UPC pursuant to Article 36 Brussels I Regulation. From a combined reading with Article 34 UPCA and Article 36 Brussels I Regulation, this binding effect would not only relate to Germany but also extend to the other Contracting Member States where the patent is in force. This argument is dismissed by the CoA.
The CoA, first of all notes that this argument based on Article 36 Brussels I Regulation can in any event not be applicable to Belkin International Inc. as this company was not part of the German proceedings Belkin relied on. As a consequence the UPC can decide on infringement in both Germany and the other relevant UPC Contracting Member States with regard to Belkin International Inc.
Furthermore, the CoA considers that pursuant to Article 36(1) Brussels I Regulation, judgements given in a Member State are recognized in other Member States. However, the question to what extent the German national decision is binding to the UPC must be decided taking into account German national law. According to German law, only the operative part of the decision will be binding and not the underlying reasons (i.e. the interpretation of the patent). Moreover, the binding effect is limited to the immediate subject matter of the dispute, i.e. to the legal consequence which, on the basis of a specific set of facts, forms the subject matter of the decision
The argument of Belkin regarding the combined reading of Article 34 UPCA and Article 36 Brussels I Regulation is also not accepted. The CoA is clear that the German national decision is only binding with regard to the German territory between the same parties (i.e. Philips and Belkin GmbH and Belkin Limited). As a consequence the UPC can grant an injunction in Germany against the defendants which were not part of the German proceedings, and in the other Contracting Member States against all defendants.
A second point of contention was who could be held liable as infringer according to Articles 25 and 63 UPCA. The CoA identified different types of actors that might be held liable as infringer.
Firstly, there is the principal infringer. On the one hand this is the person who carries out the infringing acts himself. Their liability arises even without knowledge of the patent infringement or fault being required. On the other hand it also entails any third party who has direct or indirect control over the infringing act and is in a position to terminate it (intermediary cfr. Article 63 UPCA).
Furthermore, also accomplices, instigators and accessories who do not themselves commit infringing acts, but to whom the acts of the principal infringer are attributable, are “infringers”. Therefore, injunctive relief cannot only be imposed on anyone who unallowably uses the patent invention, but also against the persons who commissioned the acts of use or incited the infringer to commit the acts of use. Moreover, injunctive relief can also be sought against an accomplice, i.e. committers of infringing acts who work together on the basis of a joint plan. However, for an accomplice to be held liable, awareness of the circumstances giving rise to the patent infringement together with awareness of the unlawfulness is required.
To the CoA, a managing director may also be held liable for patent infringement as instigator, accomplice or assistant. However, the mere position of managing director does not automatically make the director a co-perpetrator or accomplice. Only when the contested action of the managing director goes beyond their typical professional duties, they can be held liable. This will be the case when they deliberately use the company to commit patent infringements or when they are aware of the patent infringement and fail to take action. Note that a managing director of a company cannot be a “third party” in relation to that company and therefore cannot be an intermediary in the meaning of Article 63 UPCA.
Taking all this into consideration, the CoA overturned the first instance decision, thereby no longer finding Belkin’s managing director liable.
The third point is that the CoA clarified that the term “offering” within the meaning of Article 25(a) UPCA must be understood in an economic sense. To be considered an offer, it does not need to contain all the details that would be necessary for the conclusion of a contract by mere acceptance. Moreover, in the underlying case, by advertising products on the belkin.com website, including under the subpages “.com/nl”, “.com/fr” and “.com/it”; without operating an online store, was considered sufficient to constitute an offer within the meaning of Article 25 UPCA. Even more, anyone who offers the delivery of a patented product by another party, is also offering it.
Finally, Phillips’s appeal on the dismissal of the application for recall and removal form the distribution channels was successful. Moreover, corrective measures are subject to a proportionality analysis between the seriousness of the infringement and the measures ordered, the willingness of the infringer to bring the infringing product into an non-infringing state, and the interest of third parties. It is, however, the infringer who bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate that the measures are disproportionate. The CoA found that Belkin did not sufficiently proof the alleged disproportionality.
With its judgment, the CoA clearly opted to interpret the terms “infringer” and “offering” in a pragmatic manner. Not only the principal infringer falls within the scope of what must understood by “infringer”, also accomplices, instigators and/or accessories are directly encapsulated within the definition. Therefore, even managing directors might be held liable under specific circumstances. Furthermore, also the term “offering” is clarified trough an economic interpretation, dismissing a rigid legal understanding of the term. Consequently, with this pragmatic approach, it seems like the CoA wants exclude that infringers can hide behind their local entities/distributors, trying to avoid responsibilities.
By Adam Lybaert and Laura Coucke
